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The Economic Realities of Amateur
Sports Organization
JAMEs V. KoCH*
INTRODUCTION
Athletic competition at all levels has traditionally assumed a "larger than
life" role in American society. Entire cities and even regions adopt and
rabidly promote professional teams such as the Washington Redskins and
the Chicago Cubs. On the college scene, the University of Notre Dame
football team continues to benefit from a faithful group of "subway alumni"
around the country-fans who root for the Irish even though they have no
visible connection with the University. At the high school level, what can
only be labeled a cultural phenomenon-"Hoosier Hysteria"-is now a
fitting subject for lengthy discussion in national magazines.
Sporting competition does occupy a unique and sometimes almost over-
riding position in the consciousness of Americans. The daily conversations
of millions of Americans revolve around races for conference championships,
rankings in polls, and the relative merits of particular athletes or teams.
Amateur sporting competition (which for present purposes we will define to
include big-time intercollegiate athletic programs such as those in the Big
Ten Conference) is no exception to this rule. Consider that almost 35 million
individuals attended National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) foot-
ball games in 1983' and that a single institution, the University of Michigan,
has hosted over 100,000 fans at its home football games sixty times in
succession. Yes, we do pay a lot of attention to sports in general and amateur
sports in particular. As Beisser has put it, Americans have a "love affair
* Provost and Professor of Economics at Ball State University.
I. Attendance at NCAA Football Games
Season Persons, in millions
1955 17.3
1960 20.4
1966 25.3
1971 30.5
1975 31.7
1980 35.5
1983 34.8
Division I-A 25.38
Division I-AA 4.89
Division II 2.70
Division III 1.85
J. FALLA, NCAA: THE VOICE OF COLLEGE SPORTS ch. 6, app. A (1981); information supplied
by the NCAA Central Office.
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with sports." '2 This paper probes some of the economic realities that shape
that love affair.
One of many ironies associated with amateur sports competition today is
that the overall economic impact of amateur athletics in the United States
is surprisingly small. While amateur athletic organization and competition
do respond to, and do reflect, conventional economic pressures, it remains
true that amateur athletics does not constitute an industry of overwhelming
size or importance. It is likely that the direct expenditures upon amateur
athletics in the United States are considerably less than one percent of each
year's gross national product and that the total impact of amateur athletics
is only about one percent of the gross national product when indirect ex-
penditures-lodging, parking, food, and the like-are considered.3
Let me provide another perspective on this. The University of Michigan's
athletic budget may be viewed by some individuals as constituting "big
business"; however, it is the economic equivalent of a single prosperous
Marsh supermarket in central Indiana. The annual intercollegiate athletic
budgets of the entire Big Ten Conference, when combined, constitute less
than twenty-five percent of the annual sales of the smallest firm on the list
of Fortune magazine's largest 500 firms in the United States.4 One has a
tendency to lose sight of these facts when one reads of football coaches at
universities earning more than the presidents for whom they ostensibly toil,
or when one hears that Patrick Ewing, Georgetown University's former
superb basketball center, was worth an incremental $3 million annually to
the University.
It is not the raw economic size of amateur athletics, then, that should
garner our attention. Rather, it is the fact that amateur athletics constitutes
an industry that can be analyzed much like any other industry that should
be of interest to us. Far from being an exception to economic analysis,
amateur athletics, especially big-time intercollegiate athletics, has exhibited
surprisingly predictable behavior and development. The thesis of this paper
is that economic conditions, not euphemistic statements, have been the
controlling factors in the evolution of amateur athletics in the United States.
This paper will focus upon big-time intercollegiate athletics as a means of
demonstrating this.
2. A. BEISSER, TIE MADNESS IN SPORTS 227 (1967).
3. These data are taken from a study undertaken by the author for the Center of Science
and Industry, Columbus, Ohio, in connection with the 1984 Summer Olympics.
4. The dollar value of the 1983 sales of the smallest firm on the"Fortune 500" list was
over $418 million. This is over four times as great as the reported intercollegiate athletic budgets
of the members of the Big Ten Conference in 1982-1983. See The Fortune Directory of the
Largest U.S. Industrial Corporations, FORTUNE, Apr. 30, 1984, at 274, 294.
[Vol. 61:9
ANTITRUST AND AMA TEUR SPORTS
I. INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS AS AN INDUSTRY
A rough, but usable, definition of an industry is that it is a collection of
firms, each of which is supplying products that have considerable substi-
tutability to the same potential buyers. The firms in the intercollegiate athletic
industry are the individual colleges and universities that field athletic teams.
From an economic standpoint, these "university-firms" are primarily in-
volved in the selling of athletic entertainment to potential fans and ticket
purchasers. In addition, there exists the belief that the university-firms are
supplying, via their athletic teams, intangibles such as pride and identification
to alumni, legislators, and friends of the institution who might reward or
support the institution.' In addition, the university-firms in recent years have
also been actively engaged in selling to radio and television networks the
rights to broadcast or televise the intercollegiate athletic contests in which
their teams compete.
Some of the inputs to this multiproduct productive process involve capital:
stadiums, equipment, and the like. But the most crucial inputs to the pro-
duction of intercollegiate athletics are people: the coaches, athletic directors
and especially the student-athletes who play on the teams that the university-
firms field. The key to understanding the development of modern intercol-
legiate athletics is an understanding of the competition for, and use of,
inputs such as student-athletes. The development of the NCAA as the largest
regulatory body in intercollegiate athletics has primarily come about because
most university-firms have desired to limit competition between themselves
concerning how they may hire and utilize their student-athlete inputs. The
NCAA has written hundreds of detailed rules and regulations that circum-
scribe the conditions under which an individual university-firm may contact,
visit, compete for, hire, and eventually use student-athlete inputs. The genesis
of these rules has nearly always been a desire on the part of the university-
firms to restrict the competition for, and use of, student-athlete inputs. A
review of the development of the NCAA demonstrates how and why this
has taken place.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NCAA
The NCAA is the most powerful organization concerned with intercolle-
giate athletics. The NCAA currently has almost 800 individual university-
5. Detailed presentations of this analysis may be found in Koch, A Troubled Cartel: The
NCAA, 38 LAw & CoNrmpu,. PROBS. 135 (1973), and Koch, Intercollegiate Athletics: An
Economic Explanation, 64 Soc. Sci, Q. 360 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Koch, Intercollegiate
Athletics]. For a more lengthy discussion of the nature of the production function in inter-
collegiate athletics, see Koch, The Economics of "Big-Time" Intercollegiate Athletics, 52 Soc.
Sc. Q. 248 (1971).
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firms as members in addition to almost 175 other organizations and con-
ferences as institutional members.6
The NCAA has traditionally had two major rivals, the Amateur Athletic
Union (AAU) and the National Association for Intercollegiate Athletics
(NAIA). The AAU is a nonprofit, volunteer organization that is no longer
as strong a rival to the NCAA as it once was. The AAU once sponsored a
host of athletic meets that were competitive substitutes for NCAA-sponsored
events. Both the NCAA and the AAU seemingly delighted in disqualifying
each others' athletes from their meets. But the NCAA emerged victorious
in most of these jousts for two reasons. First, the NCAA has effectively
controlled the fountain source of post-high school athletic talent-the colleges
and universities. Second, the NCAA has been far better heeled financially
than the AAU and has been able to outspend the AAU in critical areas.
Today, the AAU's major efforts are confined to its Junior Olympics and
its Masters Sports and Fitness Programs.
The NCAA's only legitimate collegiate rival, the NAIA, is a much smaller
and economically less significant entity that caters to institutions that are
typically small in size and which do not seek to compete in "big-time"
intercollegiate athletics. Since 1981 the NCAA has extended its dominance
to include women's intercollegiate athletics, resulting in the demise of the
one-time capstone organization in women's intercollegiate athletics, the As-
sociation of Intercollegiate Athletics for Women (AIAW).
The NCAA was founded in 1906 as a consequence of the efforts of
President Theodore Roosevelt and others to reduce the unsavory violence
and mayhem that characterized intercollegiate football contests at the time.
An additional concern of Roosevelt and others was the preservation of
amateurism. One means of doing that was to define athlete eligibility; another
was to develop common rules for conducting games and competition. These
rules were used by the NCAA when it began to sponsor regional and national
championships in a growing number of sports. 7
The post-World War I years were boom years for intercollegiate athletics.
6. Membership of the NCAA: 1905-1983
Year Number of Members
1906 38
1909 67
1912 97
1924 135
1945 210
1949 302
1955 398
1968 609
1980 883
1983 971
J. FALLA, supra note 1, ch. 3, app. A; NCAA NEWS, various issues.
7. The NCAA currently sponsors over 80 national championships for men and women
athletes.
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Rising consumer disposable incomes, along with increased public interest in
intercollegiate athletic competition, spurred developments such as the des-
ignation of "All-American" teams by the media, the national ranking of
teams by the press, and the desire of radio networks to broadcast key
intercollegiate athletic contests.8 This led many university-firms to utilize
intercollegiate athletics both as a means to attract enrollment and in some
cases as a means to augment their revenues.
Then, as now, most fans were not interested in paying to see losing teams
compete. This led to increasingly fierce struggles between and among uni-
versity-firms for the best student-athlete inputs. Already at this time some
colleges and universities concluded that they would not compete and pay
for student-athletes. Thus, the 1920's and 1930's saw the beginning of the
membership dichotomy between smaller institutions (for example, Rhode
Island College) that chose not to compete to purchase student-athletes and
larger institutions (for example, the University of Notre Dame) that decided
to operate "big-time" intercollegiate athletic programs and to compete both
for student-athletes and ticket-purchasing fans.
The end of World War II in 1945 brought with it a flood of military
veterans into colleges and universities across the United States. This threat-
ened to upset the status quo in intercollegiate athletics, at least partially
because some university-firms fielded teams composed of individuals who
were superb athletes, but indifferent or totally uninvolved students. A series
of scandals concerning unethical practices, payoffs to student-athletes, altered
grades, and the like brought with it many cries for reform. The result was
the NCAA-sponsored "Sanity Code," 9 which sought to bring to a halt the
many abuses occurring. However, compliance with the Sanity Code was
voluntary, and the financial incentives to violate it were too great. The code
was abandoned by the NCAA in 1951.
Simultaneously, a new technological innovation, television, threatened to
alter the intercollegiate athletic landscape even further. Many colleges and
universities became convinced that the televising of intercollegiate athletic
football contests 0 reduced gate attendance at their own games. The com-
bination of adverse public attention concerning the abuses noted above and
the desire of most NCAA members to limit the effects of television upon
their gate attendance led to dramatic increases in the power and control of
the central NCAA organization. Within a few years, the NCAA was trans-
8. The first All-American team was actually selected by Walter Camp in 1889. Grantland
Rice subsequently assumed the leadership in this regard. In 1936, the Associated Press initiated
its own national ranking of football teams.
9. The Sanity Code consisted of a series of idealistic standards that individual universities
pledged to meet in intercollegiate athletics. For example, individual universities pledged to
restrict intercollegiate athletic competition on their campuses to those individuals who were
students first and athletes second. The Code failed because it was voluntary and there did not
exist any means of enforcement.
10. The first televised contest was the Columbia-Princeton game in 1939.
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formed from a coordinating organization that was largely confined to rule-
making and sponsoring championships, to one that had considerable financial
clout. This transformation occurred for two reasons: (1) the NCAA nego-
tiated lucrative television contracts for its members; and, (2) the NCAA
undertook punitive actions that often carried with them significant financial
penalties in order to enforce its rules. It is generally conceded that individual
NCAA members approved of these trends because the anticipated effect was
to equalize competition and to harness what would have otherwise been a
free market for televising intercollegiate football contests. The typical NCAA
member institution exhibited a much greater interest in protecting its share
of the intercollegiate athletic financial pie than it did in promoting either
amateurism in general or the academic progress of student-athletes in par-
ticular.
The NCAA has always controlled the television rights to its own annually
sponsored championships such as men's basketball and, until 1984, also
controlled the right to negotiate on behalf of its members the right to televise
any intercollegiate football contest." These television rights turned out to
be a gold mine for the NCAA. In the 1984-1985 academic year, for example,
the NCAA expected to earn over $31 million solely from selling the rights
to televise its Division I men's basketball championship.' 2 Prior to 1984, the
NCAA had in addition earned an average of over $65 million per year for
itself and its members from its football television contracts. 3 A 1984 United
States Supreme Court decision forced the NCAA to allow the individual
university-firms to negotiate their own football television contracts in the
same fashion that they had always been able to do in other sports such as
11. The NCAA's control over television rights for intercollegiate football games ended with
the Supreme Court's decision in NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma,
104 S. Ct. 2948 (1984) (NCAA).
12. NCAA NEws, Sept. 11, 1984, at 1.
13. Dollar Value of NCAA Television Contracts
Annual Mean Value
Season of Contract, in millions
1952 $ 1.1
1953 1.7
1955 1.3
1959 2.2
1960, 1961 3.1
1964, 1965 6.5
1966-1969 7.8
1970, 1971 12.0
1972, 1973 13.5
1978-1981 30.0
1982-1985 65.9
(This contract invalidated by U.S. Supreme Court in 1984.)
J. FALLA, supra note 1, ch. 6, app. A; information supplied by the NCAA Central Office.
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basketball. 4 This threatened the financial stability of the NCAA and at the
same time accentuated the existing inequality among the various university-
firms. Institutions like the University of Oklahoma had much greater ability
to sell the television rights to their contests than did others like McNeese
State University.
In sum, the history of intercollegiate athletics and its dominant organi-
zation, the NCAA, is one in which the financial bases for every decision
and development have become increasingly obvious. The NCAA has con-
sistently reacted to the commercialization of intercollegiate athletics in two
ways. First, it has attempted to minimize costs of competition between and
among its members by legislating rules that restrict competition, particularly
for student-athlete inputs. Second, it has attempted to retain and control
the most significant source of intercollegiate athletic revenue, the televising
of contests between its members. Unfortunately for the NCAA, the basic
structure of the intercollegiate athletic market has made these two goals
exceedingly difficult to attain. A look at the actual operation of the NCAA
will reveal why this is so.
III. THE NCAA AS A CARTEL
The NCAA euphemistically talks about "the amateur student-athlete...
who engages in a particular sport for the educational, physical, mental, and
social benefits derived therefrom and to whom participation in that sport is
an avocation."'' 5 This view of the intercollegiate athletic world would no
doubt come as a surprise to the members of the men's basketball team at
a prominent southwestern public university, for not one of the individuals
who competed on this university's powerhouse teams between 1968 and 1982
ever received a baccalaureate degree from the university.' 6
It is an easy task to provide other glaring examples of the gross discrepancy
between what is actually true in intercollegiate athletics and the innocent
rhetoric that the NCAA says typifies its activities. In fact, the NCAA has
in recent years operated primarily as an economic entity and has supported
activities that have led to cartelization. This assertion requires further ex-
amination.
A cartel is an organization of firms that agrees to pursue joint policies
with respect to key aspects of the environment in which the firms operate.
The most common subjects of agreement are pricing policies, levels of output,
14. NCAA, 104 S. Ct. 2948.
15. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC AssOcATIoN, 1983-1984 MANUAL OF THE NATIONAL
COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC AssOCIATION 9 (1983).
16. For a recent commentary on the nature of this problem, see Klein, Do College Jocks
Graduate?, Wall St. J., Nov. 11, 1984, at 26, col. 1.
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market territories, sales quotas, use of inputs and advertising expenditures.
The NCAA is a reasonably effective, though somewhat unstable, cartel
because it: (1) sets the maximum price that can be paid for intercollegiate
athletes; (2) regulates the quantity of athletes that can be purchased in a
given time period; (3) regulates the duration and intensity of usage of those
athletes; (4) occasionally fixes the price at which sports outputs can be sold;
(5) periodically informs its members about transactions, costs, market con-
ditions, and sales techniques; (6) occasionally pools and distributes portions
of the organization's profits; and, (7) polices the behavior of its members
and assesses penalties upon those deemed to have broken the organization's
rules.17
A. What Motivates the NCAA?
Insofar as the university-firms are concerned, the NCAA exists to suppress
and equalize competition between and among its members. Few, if any,
NCAA members would admit openly to this motive. However, athletic
competition works best and is most profitable when competition is relatively
equal. It is worth noting that the major spurts of "reform" in the NCAA's
history have typically occurred when there has been significant evidence of
competitive imbalance between members.' 8 The effect of these and other
"reforms" has nearly always been to suppress and equalize competition.
Indeed, there is little evidence that in the long-run the NCAA is truly
interested in reforms that have the effect of enhancing academic standards.
The NCAA and its members have seldom supported academic initiatives that
would result in competitive imbalance or reduce the profitability of inter-
collegiate athletics. As one observer has put it, the NCAA and its members
"recognize only two things-money and bad publicity."' 19 As a consequence,
"big-time college sports programs are notorious for shortchanging athletes
who are supposed to be receiving educational opportunities. ' 20
It is important to differentiate between the motivation of the university-
firms and the NCAA central organization. Whereas the members typically
are interested in some form of joint profit-maximization designed to wring
maximum revenues out of intercollegiate athletics, the NCAA central or-
ganization, like a typical bureaucracy, gives strong evidence of being interested
in its own power, size, and permanence. Concern for abstract ideals such
as amateurism and academic standards has seldom been in evidence among
17. See Koch, Intercollegiate Athletics, supra note 5.
18. For example, immediately after World War II.
19. Dan Stormer, as quoted in New Day for Athletes?, THE SPORTING NEws, Aug. 8, 1984,
at 6.
20. This is the view of The Sporting News. See id.
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the NCAA leadership. The Sporting News, which is conventionally a strong
spokesman for the sporting establishment, has in recent years frequently
taken the NCAA central office and leadership severely to task for having
over-commercialized intercollegiate atheletics. 21 The Sporting News is correct
in perceiving what has happened to the NCAA, but has exhibited a bit of
naivetd relative to the causes of this behavior. Given the financial incentives
that confront the NCAA's members, and given the structure of the inter-
collegiate athletics industry, different behavior on the part of the NCAA
and its members could hardly be expected.
B. The NCAA 's Structure as a Source of Success and Problems
Cartels succeed or fail primarily on the basis of the structure of the cartel
and the environment in which the cartel operates. Generally, the most im-
portant facets of cartel structure and environment are: (1) the number of
firms in the cartel; (2) the number of points of initiative in the cartel; (3)
the knowledge that cartel members and outsiders have of the cartel's trans-
actions; (4) the existence of barriers to entry; (5) the similarity of the interests
of the cartel members, particularly where revenues and costs are concerned;
and, (6) demand conditions in the cartel's markets. Each of these facets will
be examined in turn.
1. Number of Firms
Successful cartels seldom have large numbers of member firms. A small
membership allows the cartel to police member behavior more easily and to
impose effective discipline upon wayward cartel members. Since the NCAA
now has almost 800 individual members, it has severe difficulties monitoring
the behavior of its members. If the NCAA's enforcement division were to
visit one NCAA member daily on each day of a five-day work week, and
do so fifty-two weeks per year, it would take the enforcers over three years
simply to visit each member. This helps explain why the NCAA's Walter
Byers observed that "we are not keeping up" with cheaters even though in
1984 the NCAA deployed ten full-time and twenty-five part-time investi-
gators. The NCAA planned to spend almost $1.5 million on enforcement
activities in 1985. 22
No magic number can be deduced relative to whether or not a cartel has
too many members to be effective. It has become evident recently that the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) has been unable to
21. See, e.g., Marcin, NCAA Postpones Improving Academic Standards, THE SPORTING
NEWS, Oct. 29, 1984, at 53.
22. Walter Byers, as quoted in Farrell, NCAA Admits Difficulty in Catching Violators of
Recruiting and Financial-Aid Regulations, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Sept. 5, 1984, at 29.
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enforce price and output discipline upon its members despite having a rea-
sonably small membership of about twenty countries. On the other hand,
major league professional baseball, with twenty-six teams, and major league
professional football, with twenty-eight teams, have been relatively more
successful in maintaining member discipline. Hence, a small membership
assists, but does not guarantee, the success of a cartel.
2. Number of Points of Initiative
A point of initiative, in cartel jargon, is a place where one can buy, sell,
exchange, or otherwise utilize the property rights to a resource. Successful
cartels seldom have large numbers of points of initiative. The probability
of cartel success increases if the cartel can restrict its members to undertaking
their economic actions only at certain times and places.
The number of points of initiative are almost unlimited insofar as the
NCAA and its membership are concerned. Approximately 10,000 football
players and 1,000 coaches exist in the NCAA's highest competitive division
in football. In men's and women's basketball, the comparable numbers are
approximately 45,000 players and 1,200 coaches. The number of alumni and
camp followers of a team who might intrude are virtually infinite in number.
Add to this the antics of professional agents who seek to represent highly
skilled players in their negotiations with professional sports teams.
The large number of points of initiative militates against the NCAA's
effectiveness; however, when the NCAA can determine that a rule has been
violated, it can impose truly impressive penalties upon violators. For example,
the President of the University of Southern California (USC), Dr. James
Zumberge, estimated that an NCAA-imposed ban upon football television
appearances by USC would cost USC several million dollars 23
The NCAA has in recent years changed its internal governance several
times in order to reduce the disparity between and among members and at
the same time reduce the number of points of initiative. In football, for
example, the university-firms are now grouped in four divisions, with a
particular institution's classification depending upon the level of its own
financial commitment to intercollegiate football as well as fan interest as
indicated by attendance at football games. This has had the effect of in-
creasing homogeneity of university-firms inside a given division, but increas-
ing the heterogeneity between the divisions. Division I-A football institutions,
for example, now can legislate rules that apply only to them. This has
allowed large university-firms such as Pennsylvania State University to go
their own way without being heavily burdened by the wishes of smaller less
athletically oriented institutions such as Messiah College.
23. President Zumberge anticipated two to three television appearances at approximately
one million dollars each.
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3. Knowledge of Cartel Transactions
In effective cartels, members immediately learn of a transaction undertaken
by a member, but noncartel members are kept in a state of ignorance about
such transactions, as well as the operation of the cartel as a whole. Individual
cartel members find it difficult to cheat when other cartel members are
quickly apprised of the cheater's actions. Consider once again OPEC, the
oil cartel. The world oil market is so large and diverse that it is relatively
easy for the individual members, like Venezuela, to undercut the established
cartel price without being observed.
Much the same situation exists in the case of the NCAA. Some of its
members' actions, for example, the signing of a blue-chip athlete, are widely
publicized. Other actions, for example, procuring a lush summer job for an
athlete, are largely hidden from the view of other NCAA members as well
as the public. Indeed, when Mike Rozier, the Heisman Trophy winning
running back for the University of Nebraska, revealed in 1984 that he had
received a steady series of cash payments from a professional agent while
playing football for the Cornhuskers, this activity had not been detected by
the NCAA, or by the University of Nebraska's competitors, or even, the
University argued, by itself.24
Industries and markets that are characterized by competition are typically
ones in which any given competitor finds it extremely difficult to hide its
actions from its competitors. One gasoline station cannot long hide from
other stations the price that it charges per gallon for its gasoline. One supplier
of microcomputer softwear is hard put to disguise the features that it offers
for sale in one of its floppy disks programs. Yet, quite the opposite circum-
stances often exist in intercollegiate athletics. How can the NCAA keep track
of all of the perquisites and concessions that might be offered to the parents
and girl or boy friends of athletes being courted in locations far removed
from the campus? How can the NCAA monitor the actual prices that
supporters of a university-firm's basketball team pay the members of that
team for the complimentary tickets that each player typically receives for
each game? The answer, of course, is that the NCAA cannot do so effectively,
and that is one of the most important reasons why the NCAA receives a
relatively low grade when this aspect of cartelization is considered. Even the
NCAA's Walter Byers has joined those who admit that as many as thirty
percent of institutions that operate big-time intercollegiate athletic programs
cheat consistently without being penalized. 25
24. Mr. Rozier admitted that he received $600 per month from his agent, and that he signed
a professional contract with the Pittsburgh Maulers of the United States Football League prior
to the end of the intercollegiate football season. Vecsey, Colleges Go With a Winner, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 19, 1984, at A27, col. 1.
25. Rise in Cheating By Colleges Seen, N.Y. Times, Aug. 1, 1984, at BlI, col. 1. Mr.
Byers' views have been recorded in McCallum, Why Is This Man Saying the Things He's
Saying?, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Sept. 17, 1984, at 11.
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4. Barriers to Entry
A typical cartel strategy is to attempt to limit entry into its market in
order to enhance the chances of cartel members to earn economic rents. The
NCAA has done so, but only in a limited sense. In theory, the NCAA is a
voluntary organization with only minimal barriers to entry. Any college or
university that subscribes to the NCAA's stated purposes, and which agrees
to abide by the NCAA's rules, may join the NCAA. Nonetheless, the NCAA
has established strict requirements for admission into several of its divisions,
for example, the "big-time" Division I-A in football. In order to be classified
in Division I-A, a university-firm must sponsor a given number of inter-
collegiate sports, and then satisfy requirements that relate to the size of the
university's football stadium and the attendance at the university's football
games. For example, one possible means of qualifying for Division I-A status
in football is for a university-firm that has a home stadium that seats 30,000
or more spectators to average more than 17,000 in attendance at its home
football games at least once during a four-year period. This criterion im-
mediately eliminates from consideration well over eighty percent of all uni-
versity-firms in the NCAA.
The major reason why the Division I-A institutions wish to limit entry
into their division is so that they may fashion rules and regulations more
to their own tastes. This desire typically translates into rules and regulations
that recognize the profound economic basis and competition involved in big-
time intercollegiate athletics. When the university-firms in Division I-A re-
cently passed legislation that would have established higher academic stand-
ards which individuals must meet in order to receive the typical "full ride"
athletic scholarship offered by the institutions, the implementation of this
proposal met with stiff opposition when it was discovered that the higher
academic requirement would have eliminated a significant proportion of the
high school athletes that the Division I-A institutions typically court and
recruit. 26 It remains to be seen whether any significant minimum academic
requirements will ever be adopted by Division I-A institutions.
Until 1984, one of the significant incentives for Division I-A institutions
to limit membership in their division was the apparent correlation of Division
I-A status with increased access to the millions of dollars of football television
revenues connected to the NCAA's contract with the television networks.
The United States Supreme Court decision on that subject ended the NCAA's
practice of preventing Division I-A members from negotiating their own
26. The effects of Rule 48 would have been differentially large upon black athletes because
the rule contained a requirement that a freshman athlete receiving aid would have to have
scored at the 700 level or above on the combined verbal and quantitative sections of the SAT
examination. Fully 69% of black male athletes, and 59% of black female athletes, would have
been disqualified if such a rule were in existence. Research Forecasts Effects of "No. 48",
NCAA NEws, Sept. 29, 1984, at 1.
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football television contracts. Several different coalitions of NCAA members
now negotiate their own football television contracts. z7
The consequence of the United States Supreme Court decision has been
a weakened NCAA and more financial disparity between and among NCAA
members. But a free market for football television has also predictably
increased the number of games seen by viewers and has resulted in more
sports fans seeing the games of their choice. Under the regime of the NCAA
television package, the networks were forced to accept a range of games
that the NCAA agreed to supply. This approximated a form of "full line
forcing," a not uncommon industrial practice that sees a seller forcing
customers to accept less desirable products as a condition for receiving the
high demand, desirable products that they wish. Thus, the NCAA would sup-
ply a low-demand game such as Appalachian State versus The Citadel along
with an interest blockbuster such as the University of Oklahoma versus the
University of Southern California (USC). The NCAA offered television sta-
tions this choice on the same Saturday in fall 1981. Four stations opted for
the Appalachian State-Citadel game, while over 200 chose the Oklahoma-USC
game.
It is apparent that the NCAA television package violated the prescriptions
of consumer sovereignty, especially when it placed arbitrary limits on the
number of times that a given university-firm might appear on television, or
when it forced the networks to televise games of marginal attractiveness.
But the NCAA also engaged in price-fixing in the process. The NCAA
contract with the networks resulted in a single price being paid to any
university-firm whose team appeared on a telecast, regardless of viewer
interest or the number of stations presenting the telecast. Thus, in the 1982
example noted above, Oklahoma and USC received the same rights payment
as did Appalachian State and The Citadel. This attempt by the NCAA to
equalize the financial status of its members by means of price-fixing was
specifically prohibited by the United States Supreme Court in its 1984 de-
cision.2 The Court did not accept the argument of the NCAA that its actions
were an application of the famous Rule of Reason and thus were necessary
in order to preserve an orderly market. 29 The Court ultimately decided that
an orderly market was synonymous with a cartelized market that was not
responsive to consumer tastes. 3°
It should be noted, however, that many of the university-firms which had
fought for the right to televise their own intercollegiate football games found
that the newly instituted free market for football games actually decreased
27. For example, the College Football Association, an organization of over 60 Division I-
A football powers, now negotiates its own football television contracts.
28. NCAA, 104 S. Ct. 2948.
29. See id.
30. See id.
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the total television revenues they received. The NCAA television package
had strictly rationed the number of games that could be shown; hence, the
price that the networks had paid for each game was higher than it would
have been in the case of a free market arrangement. The demand of networks
for televising games was apparently price inelastic. Thus, when more games
were televised, this drove down the average price paid by the networks for
each game to such an extent that the total revenues collected by. the university-
firms because of football television declined by an estimated $42 million?'
That the average price paid by the networks for a typical game would fall
in a free market was predictable because the university-firms were nmoving
down the demand curve for televising their games. What the university-firms
did not forecast was the extent to which free market competition between
and among university-firms would drive television prices downward.
5. Similarity of Interests
Successful cartels are characterized by general similarity of the interests
of their members. The most important aspects of similarity relate to classic
economic variables: revenues, costs, levels of production, and the like. It
has been extremely difficult for the NCAA to reconcile, the interests and
needs of Clemson University. of the Atlantic Coast Conference with those
of a typical Prairie Conference member such as Illinois College. Clemson
University takes in more revenue from a single one of its football games
than all of the members of the Prairie Conference combined for all their
sporting events in a decade or more. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that
members of the Atlantic Coast Conference often do not see eye-to-eye with
members of the Prairie Conference when the NCAA formulates rules and
debates its future.
The amoeba-like division of the NCAA into more and more subdivisions
has been a clear attempt to group together members who have similar
revenues, costs, and output characteristics. Some view these actions as pre-
saging the imminent dissolution of the NCAA as an organization. However,
dissolution is not likely to occur. The NCAA, or some other organization
of a different name but similar objectives, will almost surely continue to
exist. There are two major reasons why this is so. First, even the NCAA's
most vocal opponents admit to a need for some form of a national orga-
nization that undertakes the regulatory and primarily noneconomic functions
of the NCAA like rule-making and the sponsoring of championships. Second,
there are significant financial disincentives that are associated with any
movement out of the NCAA by a single institution, or even a group of such
31. Colleges May Find TV's Golden Egg Is Tarnished, N.Y. Times, Aug. 26, 1984, § 5,
at 9, col. 1.
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institutions, operating a big-time program. This latter point is worthy of ad-
ditional discussion.
A successful secession movement from the NCAA would require a large
number of homogeneous university-firms to leave the NCAA at the same
time. Only then could this group negotiate its own television contracts,
conduct its own championships, and provide the considerable services that
the NCAA currently provides its members. The NCAA's only visible com-
petitor, the NAIA, is simply not a viable option in this regard if the uni-
versity-firm wishes to field nationally prominent teams that attract media
attention and ticket-purchasing fans. Consider also that some 170 institutions
in the NCAA now field Division I men's basketball teams, but are not
classified Division I-A in football. If the University of Notre Dame (Division
I-A in football) seceded from the NCAA, could it continue to schedule
Marquette University (Division I men's basketball, but not a football com-
petitor) in men's basketball?
What about women's competition? Would multiple championships arise?
Most likely, then, the NCAA or a similar organization will continue to
exist, but even more segmentation of the NCAA's membership will take
place. The degree of dissimilarity of members' interests will be the most
important determinant of any new divisions that develop. Walter Byers, the
Executive Director of the NCAA, has recently talked publicly about the
possibility of an openly professional division within the NCAA that would
pursue largely free-market intercollegiate athletic policies without reference
to old norms such as amateurism or even academic standing on the part of
the athletes involved.12 This public discussion by the NCAA's powerful leader
followed similar observations by academic leaders as diverse as Howard
Swearer, President of Brown University of the Ivy League,33 and Barbara
Uehling, Chancellor of the University of Missouri-Columbia, a member of
the Big Eight Conference.14
6. Demand Conditions
The economic success of a cartel is enhanced when the cartel purchases
its inputs from sellers who are small and unorganized. This is quite evidently
the case with respect to most intercollegiate athletes, whose ability to bargain
is constrained by collusion between and among university-firms, and whose
ability to unite and organize is severely damaged by their ages and geographic
32. Byers, as quoted in McCallum, supra note 25.
33. Swearer, An Ivy President Looks at College Sports, N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1982, § 5,
at 2, col. 1.
34. Uehling, Athletics and Academe: Creative Divorce or Reconciliation?, EDUC. REC.,
Summer 1983, at 13.
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dispersion. The result is that the university-firms often earn rents because
they possess an input that is relatively limited in supply, but which is unable
to negotiate a price for itself that approximates its market value.
As noted above, a skilled basketball center such as Patrick Ewing had an
incremental value of several million dollars to Georgetown University, the
institution that controlled his services. The approximate marginal value of
Herschel Walker, the All-American football running back for the University
of Georgia Bulldogs, was estimated to be of the same magnitude. There are
two options open to an athlete of this skill who wishes to realize some or
all of his marginal revenue product. First, he can accept illicit, under-the-
table benefits and payments, as discussed previously in the Rozier situation.
Second, he can leave the university-firm and sign with a professional team
for whatever financial rewards his skills will command. Akeem Olajuwon,
the All-American basketball center of the University of Houston, pursued
this strategy after he had completed his junior year of eligibility in 1983.
Olajuwon signed for an estimated $6.3 million spread over six years. 35
Akeem Olajuwon departed from the University of Houston before he had
exhausted all of his eligibility to play men's intercollegiate basketball. This
imposed potentially severe financial losses upon the University of Houston.
It is for this reason that traditionally the NCAA attempted to prevent any
intercollegiate athlete from leaving an NCAA member and signing with a
professional team prior to his intercollegiate eligibility having been exhausted.
This was done under the guise of "protecting" the athlete by increasing the
chance that the athlete would actually graduate from college. This self-
serving rationale on the part of the NCAA and its members was transparent
to most observers, who noted the tremendous financial interest that the
NCAA had in propagating such a rule, and the apparent disinterest the
NCAA had exhibited in whether or not any athlete ever obtained a bacca-
laureate degree. In any case, several different courts have determined that
the NCAA violated antitrust law by preventing athletes from signing profes-
sional contracts, and this rule has effectively been gutted. Note that this
development has significantly increased the financial incentives for individual
university-firms to cheat, or to condone cheating by alumni and friends of
the institution as a means to induce their exceptionally skilled athletes not
to negotiate early contracts with professional teams.
When the NCAA sells its ouputs, it confronts some customers who are
unorganized (fans who purchase tickets to contests) and some who definitely
possess some oligopsony power (television networks). In the latter case, the
NCAA has exhibited considerable skill in getting the television networks to
bid against each other for the privilege of televising events such as the
Division I men's national basketball championship, which brings over $30
million per year to the NCAA's coffers. The emergence of additional net-
35. N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1984, at BI8, col. I.
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works such as the all-sports network, ESPN, and the Atlanta Superstation
cable network associated with Ted Turner has strengthened the NCAA's
bargaining position by diluting the negotiating power of the three major
networks: ABC, CBS, and NBC.
IV. CURRENT INDUSTRY ISSUES
Currently, two issues continue to accelerate economic change in the in-
tercollegiate athletics industry. These issues are the role and development of
women's intercollegiate athletics and the perennially divisive problem of
football television.
A. Women's Intercollegiate Athletics
Until the 1970's, the NCAA exhibited no interest in women's intercollegiate
athletics. Indeed, in 1964, the NCAA specifically excluded women athletes
from competition in the men's NCAA championship events. In 1972, how-
ever, legislation popularly known as Title IX became law. 6 Title IX pro-
hibited discrimination in educational programs on the basis of sex. While
the implications of Title IX for intercollegiate athletics were ill-defined, the
NCAA and its members soon sensed that individual university-firms might
be required to expend funds in women's intercollegiate athletics roughly
equivalent to those being expended in men's intercollegiate athletics. This
scenario sent shivers of fear down the spines of the almost solely male
directors of intercollegiate athletics at the big-time football schools.
Acting on the advice of its legal counsel, the NCAA eliminated its ban
on women championship participants in 1973. Throughout the 1970's, the
NCAA central office attempted to parry Title IX in two ways. First, the
NCAA supported legislative moves, none of which was successful, to remove
intercollegiate athletics from the purview of Title IX. Second, beginning in
1975, a series of NCAA conventions was asked to approve the notion that
the NCAA should regulate women's intercollegiate athletics as well as men's.
The NCAA's interest in women's intercollegiate athletics was strongly
opposed by the Association of Intercollegiate Athletics for Women (AIAW),
which had become the clearly dominant organization for women's intercol-
legiate athletics. The AIAW argued that the NCAA's attentions were un-
wanted and that the NCAA's real interest in women's intercollegiate athletics
was in controlling and capping the rising expenditures being made there.
Expenditures on women's intercollegiate athletics rose from one percent of
total intercollegiate athletic expenditures in 1972 to over fifteen percent in
1978. 31 When, in addition, the AIAW negotiated its own television contract,
36. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1135 (West 1978).
37. Data obtained from the NCAA and AAW.
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many NCAA members sensed a growing threat to the financial security of
their men's intercollegiate programs.
One financial argument levied by the NCAA at that time was that the
growing expenditures made upon women's intercollegiate athletics required
subsidization by the major men's "revenue" sports-football and basketball
at most institutions. Why, a typical male athletic director would ask, should
a women's field hockey team benefit from the ticket and television revenues
raised by the men's football team?
The NCAA entered women's intercollegiate athletics with its own set of
women's championships in the 1981-1982 academic year. The NCAA held
its championship events on the same dates as the AIAW championships.
Hence, each member was forced to choose between the NCAA and the
AIAW. The AIAW lost this battle, at least partially because it was NCAA
policy to reimburse athletes and teams nearly all of their travel expenses to
NCAA championship events. The AIAW, lacking the lucrative football tel-
evision contract that the NCAA possessed, could not pay such expenses.
The AIAW eventually halted operations in 1983, but only after it had
filed suit and charged the NCAA with monopolization and predatory con-
duct. The AIAW noted that the NCAA would spend some $3 million on
women's intercollegiate athletics, but would generate only about $500,000
from the same programs. The AIAW charged that the NCAA was exercising
what industrial organization economists usually label "the power of the long
purse." This hypothesis, for which there is only sparse empirical evidence,
suggests that a large firm will utilize its superior resources to enter a market,
drive out smaller and less well-heeled competitors by predatory actions, and
then exploit the new market by raising prices.
A United States district court ultimately rejected the AIAW's monopoli-
zation argument, despite the fact that this case covered some of the same
economic ground as the football television case, which the NCAA lost. 8
Despite the district court's decision, strong surface similarities exist between
the behavior of the NCAA and the behavior of a multiproduct monopolist
who engages in cross-subsidization and price discrimination in order to: (1)
deter entry; and, (2) protect profits. The United States Postal Service and
American Telephone and Telegraph often have been accused of this type of
behavior in the past. Those who subscribe to this view see the NCAA as
having taken preventive action in women's intercollegiate athletics in order
to minimize the drain on its members' profits that might occur if women's
intercollegiate athletics were to go its own way. As one observer has put it:
"It is hardly blasphemy to suggest that the NCAA would have no more
interest in women's intercollegiate athletics than it does in random pick-up
basketball games on urban asphalt if it were not for the increasingly im-
38. Association of Intercollegiate Athletics for Women v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n,
558 F. Supp. 487 (D.D.C. 1983), aff'd, 735 F.2d 577 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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portant financial considerations involved." '39 In recent years, the NCAA has
rarely undertaken any important action in which financial considerations
have not buttressed or even determined the final outcome.
B. Football Television
On June 7, 1984, the United States Supreme Court ended the NCAA's
three decade reign over the televising of intercollegiate football games. By
a vote of 7-2, the Court agreed with two lower courts that the NCAA's
activities in football television constituted output restriction and price-fixing
and thus violated the Sherman Antitrust ActA4 The district court labeled the
NCAA "a classic cartel ' 41 and, in agreeing, clearly the Supreme Court
established that the rights to the televising of intercollegiate football games
belong to the individual university-firms, and not to the NCAA. 42 The Court's
decision voided multi-million dollar football television contacts that the
NCAA had negotiated for its members. 43
A major consequence of the Supreme Court decision on football television
was a period of frantic negotiations by individual university-firms and select
groups of these firms with various local television stations and with national
networks. The most lucrative contract was negotiated with ABC-TV by the
College Football Association (CFA), an organization of sixty-three Division
I-A football superpowers. Another contract was negotiated with CBS-TV by
university-firms that are members of the Pacific Ten and Big Ten confer-
ences.44 Still other less significant contracts were negotiated by individual in-
stitutions and athletic conferences.
The NCAA was initially prohibited from participating in the football
television market. However, in November 1984, the district court judge who
had rendered the original decision in the case, Judge Juan G. Burciaga,
ruled that the NCAA could participate in future football television negoti-
ations provided two conditions were met: (1) participation by NCAA mem-
bers was voluntary; and, (2) the NCAA did not once again attempt to
"restrict output or stifle competition. '4 Lacking any strong move on the
part of its members to push it in the direction of football television partic-
39. Koch, Intercollegiate Athletics, supra note 5, at 372.
40. NCAA, 104 S. Ct. 2948.
41. Board of Regents v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 546 F. Supp. 1276, 1300-01
(W.D. Okla. 1982).
42. 104 S. Ct. at 2960.
43. Greenhouse, High Court Ends NCAA Control of TV Football: Restraint of Trade Cited,
N.Y. Times, June 28, 1984, at Al, col. 1.
44. None of the institutions in the CFA is a member of the Pacific Ten or the Big Ten
conferences.
45. White, NCAA to Pass Up TV Role for Now, N.Y. Times, Nov. 2, 1984, at D19, col.
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ipation, the NCAA will no longer be a party that will negotiate football
television contracts.
But Judge Burciaga did allow the NCAA to reimpose television bans upon
university-firms that violate NCAA rules. 46 The television ban is an extremely
powerful tool in the hands of the NCAA because a single football television
appearance might be worth up to $1 million. Thus, the NCAA can once
again deny such revenues to members who violate its rules, even though it
has not been the NCAA that has negotiated the television contract. It is
this little noticed stipulation on the part of Judge Burciaga that has effectively
rehabilitated the NCAA's power as it deals with the university-firms that
operate big-time intercollegiate athletic programs. As William B. Hunt, the
NCAA's assistant director of enforcement, understated it, the "decision will
assist in the effort to implement an effective enforcement program." 47 Indeed,
no cartel can succeed if it is unable to discipline its members. The effective
power of discipline now once again resides with the NCAA. While the
operation of the NCAA as a cartel will never be smooth because of the
structure of the intercollegiate athletic market, the revived ability of the
NCAA to impose significant financial penalties upon selected members will
enable it to survive and even prosper.
It is worth noting that even the football television contracts negotiated by
the CFA and by the Pacific Ten-Big Ten conference coalition have been
challenged by legal suits sponsored by television cable companies and in-
dependent television stations. These suits charge that the new contracts violate
antitrust law by restricting competition, at least partially because the new
contracts prevent the cable networks and independent stations from televising
football games during certain time periods on Saturdays. Further, the new
contracts are designed to discourage "cross-televising," in which a CFA
member would televise a home game against an opponent from the Big Ten
Conference, a non-CFA member. Such interferences in the market, the
plaintiffs argue, are precisely what Judge Burciaga sought to prevent in his
original television decision. 48
If the newest round of suits is successful, then it is likely that no football
television agreement of a national nature will exist in the future. In such a
world, individual university-firms and specific intercollegiate athletic con-
ferences would freely and independently negotiate their own individual con-
tracts. This would hardly introduce anarchy, however, since this is precisely
46. See NCAA, 546 F. Supp. 1276 (W.D. Okla. 1982), aff'd in part, remanded in part,
707 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1983), aff'd, 104 S. Ct. 2948 (1984).
47. Judge Clears Way for NCAA to Play Role in TV Pacts, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Nov.
7, 1984, at 1, 34.
48. Judge Burciaga will have ample opportunity to make clear what he did mean because
the case involving the CFA will be heard in his courtroom. Burciaga to Hear Suit Against
CFA, NCAA NEWS, Nov. 12, 1984, at 1.
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the situation that has existed in men's basketball and all other sports for
many years. While the NCAA has often salivated at the lucrative prospect
of controlling all television for men's basketball, it has never claimed to
control the property rights to the televising. Hence, individual university-
firms have proceeded independently in men's basketball.
CONCLUSION
The National Collegiate Athletic Association is the dominant organization
in modern big-time intercollegiate athletics. Unbeknownst to most of its
members, the NCAA has in recent decades acted as an economic cartel.
Prices have been fixed, outputs controlled, and extensive rules and regulations
have been promulgated concerning the use of the primary input to inter-
collegiate athletics, the student-athletes.
The cartelized behavior of the NCAA was never a matter of great import
either to its own members or to the public until the dollar magnitude of the
NCAA's actions became large. But the NCAA's budget now approaches $40
million annually and, until thwarted by the United States Supreme Court,
the NCAA controlled television contracts worth well over $250,000,000.
Further, the annual revenues realized by Division I-A university-firms from
all phases of their football operations approached $500,000,000 in 1983-
1984. Hence, whereas the economic impact of big-time intercollegiate athletics
was a de minimus consideration in 1950, the same conclusion is less easily
reached in 1985.
In 1950, big-time intercollegiate athletics was substantially non-cartelized,
and the plethora of rules and regulations that now exist in the industry was
unknown. Many of the most important actions and decisions of the day
were made in a nonmarket context. There was much less reference to
purchasing inputs and selling outputs. Rather, intercollegiate athletics was
often sponsored by a university without reference to market acceptance, or
lack thereof.
The three-plus decades since 1950 have seen the obvious emergence of
economic motives in intercollegiate athletes. An identifiable industry now
exists in big-time intercollegiate athletics in which approximately 100 uni-
versity-firms compete in football and approximately 200 in men's basketball.
Women's intercollegiate athletics, particularly women's basketball, increas-
ingly evidences the same evolution. The NCAA has accelerated the emergence
of these developments by cartelizing the industry and consistently advocating
policies that have increased economic incentives. The NCAA, then, is both
a cause and a reflection of powerful forces that have resulted in the emergence
of big-time intercollegiate athletics as an industry.
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